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Chapter 11
HEALTH CARE POLICY AND REFORM 
IN CROATIA: HOW TO SEE THE FOREST 
FOR THE TREES
Dubravko Mihaljek*
Bank for International Settlements
Basel, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews current issues in health care policy and re-
form in Croatia. It analyses the microeconomic foundations of health 
care (characteristics of health as an essential good, market and govern-
ment failures in allocation of health care services); the role of health 
care in the process of European Union accession; the status of health 
care in Croatia (health status of the population, demographic trends, 
health care resources); microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of 
health care financing; and recent reform proposals for the health care 
sector. On this basis a number of recommendations for health care re-
form in Croatia are formulated. The proposals refer to financial sustain-
ability of health care in the medium and long term; the mix of general 
taxes and mandatory health insurance contributions as sources of pub-
lic funding; the mix of public and private funding; the impact of differ-
ent financing instruments on the operations of health care providers; 
labour market effects of different financing methods; and the political 
economy of health care reform.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a broad overview of current issues in health 
care policy and reform in Croatia. The focus is on the “big picture”, 
on seeing, from the perspective of an informed citizen, the health care 
“forest” for the trees that are being planted or cut down daily by health 
care specialists and policy makers focusing on details of health care 
policy and reform. The relationship between the health care reform and 
Croatia’s EU accession is also discussed. However, this relationship is 
only tangential: the health care sector is not really a part of the acquis; 
and even if it were, the authorities in Croatia would need to implement 
health care reforms primarily for the benefit of Croatian citizens, not 
because the authorities in Brussels demanded that they did so. 
Croatia spends about 8% of GDP annually on health care, which 
is somewhere between the average for the 15 old EU member states 
(8.8% in 2003) and the 10 new member states (7.1%; for data sources 
see Annex tables). About 84% of health care spending comes from pub-
lic sources and 16% from private sources. Within the public sector, the 
Croatian Health Insurance Institute (HZZO) accounts for 96% of gen-
eral government spending on health care. HZZO also plays a key role 
on the supply side by setting health care delivery standards (together 
with the Health Ministry) and negotiating volumes and prices of health 
services with providers. 
The bulk of resources for health care financing are collected 
from employers through mandatory payroll contributions. The remain-
der of public sources consists of transfers from the budget, i.e. general 
(rather than earmarked, as in the case of payroll contributions) tax reve-
nues. Private resources for health care financing are almost entirely pa-
tients’ out-of-pocket expenditures, given that the role of private health 
insurance is negligible. 
The health care sector has undergone major changes since the 
early 1990s. These changes have transformed a once highly decentral-
ised and overstaffed system with major regional imbalances in fund-
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ing and quality standards, into a more centralised, better funded and 
overall more efficient system of mixed public and private health care 
delivery. The system nonetheless continues to face major problems. 
Most reforms of recent years have focused on cost containment. This 
has resulted, on the one hand, in the shifting of an increasing portion of 
health care costs to households, and, on the other hand, a constant shift-
ing of “fire-fighting” efforts from one segment of the health care sector 
to another. Most of the stakeholders in health care reform are dissatis-
fied with the current situation, as reflected in an increasingly acrimoni-
ous public debate. However, since no one is willing to lose even more 
benefits, implementing more fundamental reforms has become a politi-
cal non-starter. 
Against this background, one aim of this paper is to try to in-
ject a dose of sound economic analysis into public debate on health 
care policy, so that different stakeholders in health care reform could 
perhaps start discussing the real long-term issues more dispassionate-
ly. Another aim of the paper is to encourage Croatian economists to 
do more research on the economics of the health care sector. This area 
has been rather neglected in the domestic literature and research pro-
grammes, which has contributed to the problems currently facing the 
health care sector. Problems in the health care sector will be analysed 
from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives, as has be-
come the norm in the profession over the past quarter of a century. To 
highlight the scope of the problems, the focus will be on identifying 
key issues rather than elaborating details in different segments of the 
health care sector. 
The next section will thus start with some basic microeconomic 
foundations: why health care is different from other essential goods and 
which market and government failures arise in its allocation. Some in-
sights on the situation in Croatia with regard to these micro foundations 
will also be provided. Section 3 will then turn to the role – or rather, 
the search for a role – of the health care sector in the process of EU ac-
cession. Section 4 will analyse health care in Croatia from a demand-
supply perspective, looking at basic health outcomes and demographic 
trends on the demand side, and human resources and developments in 
health care delivery on the supply side. Section 5 discusses the micr-
oeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of health care financing. The 
emphasis is on uncovering flaws in the design of financing arrange-
ments that give rise to the observed negative trends and to the dissat-
isfaction of different stakeholders with the health care system. Section 
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6 analyses how far the recent reform proposals have (or have not) ad-
dressed these flaws. Section 7 concludes with remarks on the more fun-
damental health care reforms that Croatia will have to implement in the 
medium term. The main conclusion is that health care reform is much 
more complex and difficult to design and implement than, for instance, 
pension reform.
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Why is health care different from other  
essential goods and its reform so complex?
The literature on health care economics has been primarily de-
veloped in English-speaking countries. As a result, the institution-
al frameworks of these countries have influenced the way economists 
think about health care even more than in other branches of public eco-
nomics. This refers in particular to institutional frameworks in the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom, which are polar opposites in that the 
former has no government health insurance (except that for the elderly 
and the poor) while the latter has comprehensive government health in-
surance. 
The literature usually starts from the assumption that health care 
can be analysed like any other competitive industry, and then explains 
why markets alone cannot produce efficient outcomes in the health care 
sector (see e.g. McGuire and Mayhew, 1989). One reason is that health 
care is different from other essential goods and services: the health care 
sector consists of more than a dozen markets – for different types of 
health care and medical treatment; health insurance; pharmaceuticals, 
medical equipment; labour market for medical personnel; etc. In most 
of these markets, serious market failures occur, including adverse se-
lection, asymmetry of information, increasing returns and moral hazard 
(see below). 
Another, perhaps more fundamental reason why markets alone 
cannot be relied upon to allocate health care is that good health broadly 
shared is intrinsically valued in all societies (Hsiao, 2000:6). Inequities 
in health and access to health care offend our innate sense of justice and 
fairness. The notion that, at the minimum, every individual should have 
access to basic medical services and medicines to relieve pain and suf-
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fering and to avoid untimely death is universally shared (ibid:6). As the 
cost of modern medicine is not affordable to most lower-income house-
holds, they need either medical insurance or access to subsidised health 
services in case of serious illness. Even for the better-off households, 
the costs of treating a major illness can lead to financial ruin. Some 
form of health insurance and government involvement in the provision 
of affordable health care is thus unavoidable from an ethical point of 
view.
But health insurance also has a strong economic rationale. In 
both rich and poor countries, about 25-30% of health care expenditure 
is spent on 1% of the population, and about 60% is spent on 5% of the 
population (Hsiao, 2000:11). For 20-25% of the population, there is no 
spending on health care in a given year (Table 1). However, it is dif-
ficult to predict which individuals will be in those 1% or 5% catego-
ries that absorb the bulk of healthcare spending. This provides a funda-
mental rationale for health insurance, as shown in the seminal paper by 
Arrow (1963). 
In Croatia, as in most former socialist countries, discussions 
about healthcare policy and reform usually start from the opposite end 
of the spectrum – the general assumption that access to health care is 
universal, equal and basically free to every individual. Universal right 
to health protection is constitutionally guaranteed in Croatia (“Every-
one is to be guaranteed the right to health care, in conformity with the 
law”, Article 58). However, many policymakers and members of the 
public seem to confuse the ethical norms noted above with basic eco-
nomic laws, which operate even in the health care sector, despite the 
fact that health is a special good.
Table 1  Healthcare expenditure by percentage of population for all age 
groups1
Percent of total population Percent of total health expenditure
1
5
10
50
80
29
60
74
98
100
1 Data for the United States, 1998.
Source: Hsiao (2000:12).
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For instance, the basic law of demand states that, if one reduces 
the price of a good or service, then people consume more of that good 
or service. In the case of health care, the price that people pay for serv-
ices such as routine doctor visits, vision care, or low-cost treatment of 
minor illnesses and injuries is being reduced by comprehensive health 
care coverage. The law of demand states that this will increase the use 
of such care – people will visit doctors more often because routine vis-
its are covered by health insurance.i This will result in excess demand: 
providers will not have an incentive to increase supply because the 
price is fixed below equilibrium level. Excess demand will be resolved 
through rationing – those willing to get cheap routine care will have to 
queue for such services. To avoid the waste resulting from over-con-
sumption of routine care, the price of such services needs to be raised. 
One way to do this is through deductibles and co-payments, but with 
appropriate solutions for low-income families.ii
In contrast to routine health care, for major illnesses and hospi-
tal stays, it makes good economic sense – and is ethically correct – to 
cover most of the cost by insurance. This is consistent with the princi-
ple that insurance should protect people against disproportionate finan-
cial loss due to illness – in particular, against catastrophic loss – but it 
should not insulate them from the cost of all health care.
Economists and healthcare experts in countries such as Croatia 
thus have to explain to policymakers and the public why governments 
alone cannot and should not finance all the costs of health care.iii One 
consequence of this starting position is that political economy consid-
erations are of paramount importance for the success of healthcare re-
forms (see concluding section). 
Market and government failures  
and the situation in Croatia 
Market failure is a situation in which markets do not organise 
production or allocate goods and services efficiently. Economists nor-
mally apply this term to situations where the market is failing to create 
maximum efficiency. It does not mean that the market has collapsed or 
ceased to exist; it suggests that non-market institutions such as govern-
ment regulation might improve the market outcome. In the healthcare 
sector, market failures occur in most of the markets making up the sec-
tor.iv 
283
Informational asymmetries are present both in the supply of 
medical services and health insurance, where they are known as “ad-
verse selection” and “moral hazard” problems (see below). On the sup-
ply side, the complexity of the technical data on medical treatment, the 
multiplicity of choices and the distressed state of mind of many who 
discover that they are ill make it difficult for the patient to obtain and 
process all information relevant to his or her illness. The patient must 
therefore rely on the supplier (physicians, other medical professionals) 
for the provision of information on the potential choices available and 
the gains associated with the treatment. In an unregulated market envi-
ronment, this creates the possibility of severe exploitation of patients 
by doctors, who are in a more or less monopolistic position with regard 
to information on medical treatment.v 
One solution to the problem of informational asymmetries is the 
development of a contractual or “agency” relationship between the doc-
tor and the patient, for instance, through legislation on patients’ rights 
enforceable in courts of law. A complementary solution is the develop-
ment of self-regulated standards of professional conduct by the medi-
cal profession – e.g. self-regulation of entry to the profession and the 
imposition of ethical standards after entry. These solutions do not guar-
antee perfect outcomes. For instance, entry barriers into the medical 
profession restrict supply and increase the price of health care; mainte-
nance of ethical standards of doctors’ behaviour may be hard to enforce 
in courts. Nevertheless, these solutions are necessary to overcome the 
worst problems associated with informational asymmetries. One aspect 
of this problem that seems to be particularly pronounced in Croatia and 
will need to be addressed as part of the EU accession process is the lack 
of adequate legislation on patients’ rights and inadequate enforcement 
of existing legislation.vi 
Complexity and uncertainty in health care provision arise be-
cause every case is potentially different from every other and may also 
develop in different ways from previous cases. The market is unable to 
cope efficiently with these problems. This places an even greater im-
portance on ethical behaviour of doctors, who should provide reassur-
ance that they are acting in the patient’s best interest.
Increasing returns arise because, with medical care becom-
ing more complex, there is a growing need for specialist advice and 
specialist medical equipment, both of which are costly and require a 
large number of patients to justify their use economically. In a mar-
ket environment these aspects of production increase the probability of 
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oligopolistic structures emerging. Since oligopolistic prices are higher 
than competitive prices, there is a need for government regulation of 
pricing of medical services.
Adverse selection occurs when higher-risk individuals such as 
smokers do not tell a private insurance company about their health risk. 
As a result, the insurance company calculates a premium that does not 
cover its expected costs for insuring the higher-risk individuals. When 
these costs materialise, the insurance company raises premium for all 
the insured, including the lower risk individuals such as non-smokers. 
The higher premium may then cause some lower-risk individuals to 
switch to another insurance company, which offers a lower premium. If 
no action is taken, this will lead to a vicious cycle and the ultimate col-
lapse of the insurance scheme. 
Adverse selection can be reduced by letting insurers set more ac-
curate premia; e.g. by giving them more information or lifting restric-
tions on how premiums are set. However, this may discriminate against 
chronically-ill and high-risk people, who may to be unable to get health 
insurance at fair prices. To avoid this situation, the authorities regulat-
ing private insurance companies typically define a list of pre-existing 
health conditions which cannot be excluded from insurance plans.
There is no information on the extent to which the problem of 
adverse selection in private insurance plans is present in Croatia. As 
noted above, the role of private health insurance plans is minimal at the 
moment. But as these plans become more important in the future the 
authorities will need to take the problem of adverse selection into ac-
count in regulatory solutions. 
As for the problem of adverse selection in the state-run health 
insurance plan, the high proportion of lifestyle diseases related to obes-
ity, lack of physical activity, smoking and alcohol and drug abuse, and 
the fact that everyone pays the same insurance contributions, suggest 
that the cost of treating such diseases is essentially being subsidised by 
people who do not expose themselves to such health risks. This raises 
financial, equity and fairness issues which have yet to become the sub-
ject of public debate in Croatia.
The term moral hazard refers to the increased risk of careless 
behaviour and thus a negative outcome (“hazard”) because the person 
who caused the problem does not suffer the full (or any) consequences 
of his or her behaviour, or may actually benefit at the expense of others. 
In health insurance this problem would arise if individuals were tak-
ing less care of their health – e.g. exercising less, smoking and drink-
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ing more, taking fewer check-ups than would otherwise be the case – 
just because they knew they were insured. The most important way to 
mitigate moral hazard is through special provisions (“riders”) in insur-
ance contracts. For instance, many health insurance companies include 
a provision that requires the insured to obtain regular check-ups, dental 
cleanings, etc. or offer discounts for non-smokers and people who ex-
ercise regularly. 
It is not clear how far the problem of moral hazard is present 
under Croatia’s comprehensive health insurance. In 2004 and 2005 the 
two top-selling drugs were cholesterol-reduction medicines.vii Wide-
spread smoking and alcohol abuse and the fact that smokers and heavy 
drinkers do not pay higher health contributions further indicate that 
there is considerable scope for the moral hazard problem. In a more 
fundamental health care reform the authorities would therefore need to 
take determined action against different forms of irresponsible behav-
iour of insured persons.viii 
Government failure is the public sector analogy to market fail-
ure and occurs when a government does not efficiently allocate goods 
and/or resources to consumers of government services. Just as a market 
failure is a problem that prevents the market from operating efficiently, 
a government failure is not a failure of the government to bring about 
a particular solution, but rather a systemic failure that prevents an effi-
cient government solution to a problem. 
An example of government failure in the health care sector 
most relevant to Croatia is the dominance of health practitioners’ inter-
ests over the interests and welfare of patients. According to Transpar-
ency International (2005), 32% of Croatian citizens think that corrup-
tion in the health care sector is “widespread”, and 48% think that it is 
“very widespread”.ix Sometimes the dominance of physicians’ interests 
is more or less officially sanctioned. Physicians employed by the state 
were for many years allowed to pay symbolic rents for state-owned fa-
cilities to use for their private practices after regular working hours.x 
Such a practice is, of course, unimaginable in the EU or even in other 
public-sector professions in Croatia. That it was legal is a testimony to 
the political clout that the medical profession has secured in Croatian 
society.xi It is also prima facie evidence of a systemic failure of govern-
ment bureaucracies to operate the health care system in the interest of 
the citizens.xii 
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HEALTH CARE SECTOR AND  
EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION
The relationship between European law and health policy is 
complex and often confusing, in part because there is no clear demar-
cation of the competence of the member states and the European insti-
tutions in health matters.xiii Article 129 of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty 
stated that “the Community will contribute to a high level of health 
protection for its citizens” and made provision for community action to 
prevent major diseases. This article provided the basis for a programme 
of action in health promotion, information, education and training in 
public health, including in areas such as the fight against cancer, AIDS 
and other communicable diseases; collection of health data; and occu-
pational health and safety; pollution-related diseases and rare diseases. 
In the Amsterdam Treaty revision of 1997 it is stated that “Com-
munity action shall be directed towards improving public health” 
(Article 152). However, what exactly is meant by public health was not 
defined – the border between public health and policies in many other 
areas, such as the environment and consumer protection, is indistinct. 
Health considerations are also implicit in many other articles of the 
Treaty, such as those on research, agriculture, social policy and mecha-
nisms to promote free movement of people and goods. The Amsterdam 
Treaty also sought to clarify how EU law affects health services, stating 
that “Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect 
the responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and deliv-
ery of health services and medical care” (Article 152). 
However, this exclusion of health services from the competence 
of the EU and the implicit recognition that such services were the re-
sponsibility of national governments soon proved to be not quite so 
simple. Health services can only operate by using many inputs that are 
covered by the single market. Free movement embraces goods such as 
medical technology and pharmaceuticals; people such as patients and 
health professionals; and services such as pharmaceutical research and 
development. The production and movement of these inputs are subject 
to European law, in particular in that they must be transparent and non-
discriminatory. 
For instance, a single market, guaranteeing freedom of move-
ment of people, can only function if those people can travel without 
fear of losing the protection they enjoy in their own countries in respect 
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of health care. Thus, a series of directives in the early 1970s set out 
mechanisms for various groups of people whose work involved cross-
border travel to receive health care in other member states, with provi-
sions for those abroad temporarily to obtain care in an emergency. In 
addition, mechanisms were put in place to enable those organizations 
paying for health care to send patients abroad for treatment. In the late 
1990s, the European Court of Justice passed several rulings which es-
tablished the right of patients to obtain health care abroad without prior 
authorisation. These rulings have shown that the health care sector of 
the member states was gradually coming within the reach of commu-
nity law. 
Health services were part of a draft EU Directive on Services 
that was rejected by European Parliament in early 2006 after some-
times bitter debates. However, by September 2006 an “orientation dis-
cussion” on harmonisation of certain aspects of health care services 
had started among EU members, indicating that this topic will stay on 
the EU agenda.
As a result of the growing complexity of the relationship be-
tween European law and health policy, almost all chapters of the ac-
quis have some implications for health care. Those of particular rel-
evance are Chapter 13, on social policy and Chapter 23, on consumers 
and health protection. But other chapters also contain important pro-
visions related to health care: Chapters 1-3 on the free movement of 
goods, persons and services; Chapter 12 on food safety; Chapter 27 
on the environment; etc. Details on the position of health care in these 
chapters and on Croatia’s standing with regard to the fulfilment of EU 
requirements are beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, in a pe-
riod of intensive accession negotiations they are a moving target. Ac-
cording to the 2005 European Commission Progress Report, for in-
stance, Croatian legislation only partially covers the acquis in the vari-
ous sectors of consumer and health protection (European Commission, 
2005:102). In the chapter on social policy, the main conclusion is that 
this area appears to have been “rather neglected” (ibid:78), while im-
plementation and enforcement capacity will need to be substantially 
improved if the acquis in the field of health and safety at work are to 
be properly applied (ibid:77). How long this might take in practice re-
mains difficult to say. The Croatian authorities seem to be relatively op-
timistic and believe that it will take about two and a half years (i.e. until 
the end of 2008) to complete adjustment of overall legislation (not just 
that relating to health care) with the acquis.xiv 
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Finally, one should note that the Croatian Ministry of Health is 
not in charge of negotiating any particular chapter of the acquis. These 
responsibilities are split among several ministries, which increases the 
need for coordination of activities among different parts of the govern-
ment. To the extent that cooperation among ministries is hampered by 
lack of resources and skills and by bureaucratic rivalries, the adoption 
of the acquis could be further slowed down.
HEALTH CARE SECTOR IN CROATIAxv 
Health status of the population
The picture on the health status of the Croatian population is 
mixed, with some indicators showing relatively good health outcomes 
and others showing relatively poor outcomes. Life expectancy at birth 
– 72 years for males and 79 years for females in 2004 – compares fa-
vourably with both EU-15 (76 and 82 years, respectively) and EU-10 
averages (71 and 79 years), in particular considering the difference in 
per capita income (about 40% of EU average in PPP terms in 2004) 
(Table A1 in Annex). However, Croatian men and women can expect to 
be sick one more year during their lives than average citizens of the old 
and the new Europe (Table 2).
Table 2 Life expectancy at birth and years of healthy life, 2004
Life expectancy  
at birth (years)
Expected years  
of healthy life
Expected years  
of sickness1
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Croatia 72 79 64 69 8 10
EU-15 76 82 69 73 7 9
EU-10 71 79 64 70 7 9
1  Calculated as the difference between life expectancy at birth and expected 
years of healthy life.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A1); author’s calculations.
Adult mortality rates in Croatia are lower than in the new mem-
ber states – 160 people per 1,000 die in Croatia between the ages of 15 
and 60, compared with an average of 205 in EU-10 – but significantly 
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higher than in EU-15, where the adult mortality rate is 113 per 1,000 
(Annex Table A1). The infant mortality rate is the same as in EU-10 
(6 deaths per 1,000 live births), but again significantly higher than in 
EU-15 (4 infant deaths per 1,000 live births).
Where health outcomes show a particularly large gap with re-
spect to the old (and to a lesser extent the new) Europe is in terms of 
major causes of death. Croatia has a higher age-standardised mortality 
rate than EU-15 for virtually all non-communicable diseases: cardio-
vascular diseases, cancer, injuries, chronic respiratory diseases, diabe-
tes and other chronic diseases. For instance, in Croatia there were 356 
deaths from cardio-vascular diseases per 100,000 people in 2002, al-
most double the average in EU-15 (185 deaths) (Table A1 in Annex). 
These developments are probably closely related to the spread of an 
unhealthy lifestyle, as can be seen from the following health risk indi-
cators (see Table 3):
•  Croatia has an extremely high proportion of obese people – almost a 
quarter of the adult population is overweight, which is almost double 
the average in EU-15 and 50% higher than in EU-10. 
•  Prevalence of tobacco use is very high, especially for Croatian wom-
en (23% of adult women consume tobacco products regularly) and 
school-age children (19% of boys and girls aged 13 to 15 smoke cig-
arettes). 
•  Alcohol consumption in Croatia is 25% above the EU-15 average 
and almost 50% above the EU-10 average. Croatia is in the 5th place 
in the world in terms of adult per capita wine consumption (after 
Luxembourg, France, Portugal and Italy), and in the 15th place in the 
world in terms of per capita consumption of beer. Not surprisingly, 
mortality rates from alcohol-related diseases are very high.xvi 
•  In addition, prevalence of physical inactivity is very high. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) data (not shown in Table 3) indicate that 
in 2003, 47% of Croatian men and 51% of Croatian women were 
physically inadequately active.xvii
In summary, major preventable health risks are highly present 
in Croatia and the authorities could and should do much more to edu-
cate the population about the seriousness of these risks for health. This 
is important to emphasise because the 2006 health care development 
strategy (MZSS, 2006) fails to stress sufficiently the links between 
health risks and health outcomes, leaving the impression that the state 
of health of the Croatian population is mostly good.xviii
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Table 3 Selected health risk indicators
Adults (≥ 15 years) 
who are obese1
Prevalence of 
current tobacco use1
Alcohol 
consumption  
(per capita per 
year, in litres)2 Males Females Males Females
Croatia 22 23 32 23 16.2
EU-15 13 13 32 20 12.9
EU-10 14 17 40 18 8.3
1 Percent of total population. 
2  Total recorded and unrecorded consumption per adult (15 years and older), 
in litres of pure alcohol.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A2) and WHO (2004).
Demographic trends
To round off the picture on the demand for health services, one 
needs to consider the main demographic trends. As in most Europe-
an countries, population trends in Croatia have been unfavourable for 
some time. Between 1995 and 2004, total population declined at an 
average annual rate of -0.3% (Table A3 in Annex). Croatian women 
bear fewer children on average (1.35) than women in EU-15 (1.6) and 
about the same as those in the new member states. 
As in the rest of Europe, the population in Croatia is rapidly get-
ting older. According to the 2001 census, 16% of the population was 
65 or older; 67% was of working age (15-64 years); and 17% was be-
low the age of 15 (Table 4). By 2050, according to the latest projections 
of the State Statistical Bureau, the share of elderly in total population 
might rise to 27%, and the share of the working age population might 
decline to 59%. The old-age dependency ratio – population aged 65+ 
as a share of population aged 15-64 – would thus increase from about 
23% in 2001 to 46% in 2050, and the total dependency ratio (the eld-
erly plus children as a percentage of the working-age population) from 
49% to 69% (Table 4). 
But this is only part of the demographic picture with negative 
implications for health insurance. The ratio of population not pay-
ing health insurance contributions to employed persons is already ex-
tremely unfavourable, about 2:1 (Table 4). In other words, for every 
employed person, mandatory health insurance contributions have to be 
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high enough to cover insurance premia for two additional persons who 
do not pay the contributions. This in itself is quite enough to show that 
Croatia’s health insurance system faces major long-term sustainabili-
ty problems. Only one-third of the population is paying for health in-
surance, while the remaining two-thirds – retirees, family members of 
insured persons, the unemployed and other non-active persons – are 
not paying health insurance contributions even though they account for 
well over two-thirds of health care costs. While there was some im-
provement in the ratio of the non-paying population to the employed 
between 2000 and 2005, with population-ageing this ratio will inevita-
bly deteriorate, even if employment rates remain unchanged.
Table 4 Demographic trends and health insurance 
Age  
(years)
Percentage share Ratio of population not paying 
mandatory health insurance 
contributions to employed (%)1
In total In working-
age population
2001 2050 2001 2050 2000 2005
Children 
(0-14)
17 14 26 23
Total not paying/
Employed 
1.98 1.85
Working age 
(15-64)
67 59 100 100
Retirees/  
Employed
0.70 0.66
Elderly  
(65+)
16 27 23 46
Family members/ 
Employed
0.97 0.83
Children  
plus elderly
33 41 49 69
Unemployed/ 
Employed
0.09 0.09
1  Total population not paying contributions also includes other non-active 
categories of persons.
Sources: DZS (2006); HZZO (2002; 2006); author’s calculations.
The high proportion of retirees in Croatia’s population is also 
significant for the health care sector because the distribution of health 
expenditure by age is highly skewed towards older people. In the Unit-
ed States, for which the most comprehensive data are available, 36% 
of total health care expenditure is incurred by those 65 years and older, 
whose share in total population is 12%. For Croatia there are no com-
parable data, but as an approximation one can use HZZO expenditure 
on retirees and their families, which has accounted for about 43% of to-
tal HZZO expenditure since 2000. This proportion can be expected to 
increase faster than the share of elderly in total population (currently at 
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16%), because demand for health care will increase with rising per cap-
ita income, again raising the question of the sustainability of the cur-
rent system.
Health care providers
Viewed from the supply side, the situation in Croatia’s health 
care sector is even less favourable than would be suggested by the above 
comparisons of health outcomes and demographic trends. Croatia has 
significantly fewer physicians, nurses, midwives and pharmacists per 
1,000 inhabitants than either EU-15 or EU-10 on average (Table 5). 
Dentists are the only health professionals whose numbers compare fa-
vourably with European averages. In terms of hospital beds, Croatia 
has less overcapacity than the new member states and is basically at the 
average EU-15 level. Other indicators of hospital capacity compare fa-
vourably with European averages; one exception is the average length 
of stay in hospitals (11 days), which is longer than the EU average 
(9 days).xix
Table 5 Resources in the healthcare sector (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Physicians Nurses Midwives Dentists Pharmacists Hospital 
beds1
Croatia 2.4 5.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 5.5
EU-15 3.3 9.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 5.4
EU-10 3.2 6.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 6.4
1 Per 10,000 inhabitants.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A3).
When comparing these data with health outcomes one can draw 
two preliminary conclusions. First, in terms of utilisation of human re-
sources, the healthcare sector in Croatia appears to be fairly efficient: 
with 25-50% fewer healthcare professionals it helps “produce” ba-
sic outcomes such as healthy life expectancy that are not significant-
ly lower than EU averages. Second, the one health profession where 
there seems to be adequate supply of services – the dentists – is also the 
one where private practice predominates and most expenses are out-
of-pocket. Few complaints tend to be heard about the quality of serv-
ices and corruption in dental care. What this case demonstrates is that 
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market mechanism can be relied upon to produce efficient outcomes 
for some health services and reduce – perhaps even eliminate – gov-
ernment failure. It would therefore be interesting to investigate why 
Croatian citizens have accepted the notion that they have to pay for 
dental services. 
Croatia’s health service providers are further organised into pri-
mary (general and family practitioners, emergency care etc.), second-
ary (specialised care and hospitals) and tertiary sectors (highly spe-
cialised care, teaching hospitals, medical research facilities) as well as 
health institutes (including public health institutes). How these sectors 
are organised and problems of their operation will not be discussed in 
detail in this paper.xx But some issues that arise in the context of health-
care financing and reform need to be mentioned.
One of the key issues is the imbalance that has developed be-
tween primary and secondary care. In most European countries prima-
ry care facilities treat about three quarters of medical cases. In Croatia, 
they treat less than 50% of all cases. The counterpart has been a rap-
id growth of cases treated by specialists in secondary and tertiary fa-
cilities, which expanded by 30% in five years (MZSS, 2006:27). This 
has resulted in duplication of much diagnostic and laboratory work, un-
necessary highly specialised treatment and rising overall costs, as pro-
vision has shifted towards more sophisticated and expensive forms of 
health care. Moreover, the supply of preventative health services has 
been on the decline in recent years, while expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals has increased rapidly.xxi
At the same time, hospitals have been confronted by the lack 
of financial resources and reliable mechanisms for quality assurance 
(WHO, 2005). There have also been imbalances in the distribution of 
hospital beds by type of care (acute or short-term vs. chronic or long-
term) and in the regional distribution of hospital resources (World 
Bank, 2004). In particular, decentralisation of governance has brought 
most secondary health care facilities under the ownership of local gov-
ernments, which lack adequate financial, management and oversight 
resources to ensure efficient functioning of hospitals.
FINANCING
Unfavourable trends in the health care sector are usually ex-
plained by the lack of resources devoted to this sector in Croatia. How-
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ever, as noted in the Introduction, Croatia does not lag behind EU-15 
in terms of the share of health care expenditure in GDP, and on aver-
age spends more on health care than the new member states. In this sec-
tion it will be argued that, rather than to the lack of funding, the nega-
tive trends in health care can be traced to some flaws in the design of 
health care financing at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. 
In other words, the relatively large resources that the society devotes to 
the health care are partly wasted because of the flaws in the system of 
health care financing.
Microeconomic aspects
Primary health care. As the “gatekeepers” of the healthcare sys-
tem, primary-care physicians play an influential role in determining the 
costs of health care by prescribing drugs and referring patients for spe-
cialist or hospital care. In Croatia, primary-care physicians are paid on 
the basis of “capitation” payments, i.e. flat fees per patient per year. 
This system was introduced in the early 1990s, probably for ease of ad-
ministration and because it prevents over-billing. However, when the 
authorities introduced this system, they apparently did not take into ac-
count that it would provide an incentive to physicians to sign up as 
many patients as possible.xxii As a result, they might end up with too 
many patients for the limited amount of time they have. This would 
lead to rationing of services to free up time to see more patients. Some 
preventative care might be cut back; more patients might be referred 
to specialists than would otherwise be the case (as this would save the 
primary-care doctor time for more detailed check-ups); and medicines 
might be prescribed more liberally. For instance, although the number 
of prescriptions per patient per year is limited to five, the per capita 
number of prescriptions rose steadily from 6.0 in 1998 to 8.1 in 2005 
(HZZO, 2005).xxiii An additional reason for the shifting of healthcare 
provision to secondary and tertiary facilities is that capitation payments 
do not allow most primary care doctors to equip their offices adequate-
ly, so they are more or less forced to send patients to clinics and hos-
pitals.
Hospital financing. Unlike primary care, the hospital payment 
system consists of three separate components: (i) for patient accommo-
dation hospitals are paid a flat fee per bed per day; (ii) physicians’ serv-
ices are mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis, using the WHO point 
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system; (iii) pharmaceuticals and other materials are paid separately, 
depending on the cost of each item. In addition, each hospital budget is 
limited by a “global ceiling”, with hospitals being subject to financial 
penalties if they exceed the ceiling. 
Although more diverse, these hospital financing methods also 
have some serious flaws. Capacity-based payments encourage hospitals 
to keep the beds full and extend the length of stay, since high occupan-
cy results in steady funding based on the per diem reimbursement. Low 
occupancy rates also increase the risk that global ceiling on the hospital 
budget might be lowered the following year. Reimbursing physicians 
on a fee-for-service basis is certainly an improvement compared with 
flat fees in primary care, but this system works properly only if the fees 
are set at levels that provide reasonable compensation to physicians, 
and if bills they submit are properly monitored and audited. There is no 
solid evidence that these conditions are fulfilled in Croatia.
More generally, none of the three hospital payment methods 
provides an incentive for hospitals to increase productivity: the HZZO 
essentially reimburses hospitals for inputs used rather than outcomes 
(World Bank, 2004:25). Hospital management therefore has no incen-
tive to try to economise on inputs and realise higher net income for dis-
tribution to owners (central and local governments) or hospital employ-
ees. On the other hand, when hospitals are faced with an unexpected 
rise in costs that might break the overall budget limit, the management 
cannot adjust staffing levels and often has to implement ad hoc cost-
saving measures such as restricting the use of medications or proce-
dures (World Bank, 2004).
In 2002, the government introduced a case-based payment sys-
tem (so-called payment per therapeutic treatment) under which HZZO 
negotiates volume contracts with all hospitals for selected interven-
tions. This method was intended to reduce the waiting lists while im-
proving control over the total costs, as hospitals no longer charged for 
each service but instead for entire therapeutic treatments. The introduc-
tion of this method has helped reduce the average length of stay for 
most of the interventions. However, hospitals were given the flexibility 
to choose whether to bill HZZO under the point-based or the treatment-
based system on a case-by-case basis. This has apparently led to a form 
of “gaming”, whereby the hospital was implicitly guaranteed the high-
est payment (World Bank, 2004:29). As a result, the overall hospital 
costs did not decline significantly.
296
Co-payments. Health care services in Croatia are not entirely 
free: under the basic health insurance system, patients are required to 
pay to access health services through a system of co-payments rang-
ing from 15% to 75% for different types of treatment and up to 100% 
for medicines.xxiv Moreover, there is no reimbursement for most types 
of treatment from private providers such as dentists and various spe-
cialists. The authorities have emphasised the role of co-payments as a 
means of increasing the share of private health care financing. How-
ever, the contribution of co-payments to the overall health budget has 
been limited, as large segments of the population are exempt from mak-
ing the payments.xxv 
Health expenditure generally represents a small proportion of 
total household spending, about 2.3% on average during 2003-05.xxvi 
But there is evidence that out-of-pocket expenditure represents a heavy 
burden for some financially more vulnerable groups.xxvii Another ineq-
uity in the current system is that those with chronic diseases face par-
ticularly large out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, the rationale for impos-
ing relatively high co-payments for preventative care is unclear. Al-
though the burden of co-payments can be reduced by subscribing to 
supplementary health insurance (which is also run by HZZO), the in-
troduction of this insurance scheme has not reduced the financing bur-
den for the HZZO.
Sick leave, maternity leave and disability allowances account 
for 12-14% of total HZZO expenditure. These costs are in other coun-
tries financed and administered separately from health insurance funds, 
often as part of unemployment insurance programmes, but were appar-
ently imposed on HZZO for purely administrative reasons. In the eval-
uation of the World Bank (2004:38), Croatia provides one of the most 
generous sick leave and maternity leave compensation schemes by in-
ternational standards, with the state taking on almost the entire risk of 
added labour costs due to illness or maternity. There is little incentive 
on the part of the employers and employees to be judicious in the use of 
sick benefits. Given their size, a more rational use of these allowances 
is likely to have a far greater impact on reducing health care expendi-
ture than, for instance, the announced cost-saving measures for phar-
maceuticals (see below). 
On the other hand, there are indications that disability and some 
other allowances (e.g. for war veterans) are insufficient to guarantee 
minimum socially acceptable living standard to many users of these 
allowances.xxviii This situation has not been conducive to social dia-
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logue and tolerance because it has created the impression that the state 
is wasting public resources on some groups in the population (given the 
widespread abuse of sick leave allowances among the employed) while 
at the same time it has been overly frugal with those who indeed need 
the help (given that most disabled persons and many recipients of vet-
erans’ allowances do not have other sources of income). However, this 
issue would probably have to be addressed outside the narrow scope of 
health reform (see concluding section).
Macroeconomic aspects
About 80% of health care costs in Croatia are financed through 
health insurance contributions (payroll tax) assessed on employees’ sal-
aries.xxix The remaining 20% are financed through transfers from cen-
tral and local government budgets (i.e. from other tax revenues); sup-
plementary and private health insurance; borrowing by HZZO; and oth-
er sources. The basic contribution rate for mandatory health insurance 
is 15%. Since 2003, the contributions are paid only by employers, i.e. 
there is no sharing of the burden with employees, as was the case be-
tween 2000 and 2002, when employers contributed 7% and employees 
9% of employees’ salaries.xxx 
In other words, 80% of all health insurance costs in Croatia 
are paid by employers – they finance health insurance not only for the 
workers they employ, but also most of the costs for insuring retirees, 
members of families of insured persons, the unemployed and other in-
active groups in the population. Although this simple fact has major im-
plications not just for the health care financing but also for the labour 
market, it seems to have escaped the attention of different stakeholders 
in health care reform, including international organisations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF that support reform efforts in Croatia’s health 
care sector.
The link between the burden of health care financing for em-
ployers and the labour market needs to be explained in some detail. 
Mandatory health insurance contributions automatically increase la-
bour costs for employers by 15%. This encourages employers to hire 
workers on temporary contracts, to hire workers without registering 
them, or to substitute capital for labour. Such practices affect in particu-
lar the young, female workers and those who are not satisfied with their 
current jobs but do not actively seek other jobs (in which they could be 
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more productive) because of fear of unemployment. If health insurance 
costs for employers were partly reduced (several possibilities are dis-
cussed below), labour costs would be reduced proportionately without 
reducing net wages, which would most likely encourage employers to 
create new jobs. Health insurance reform is thus closely related to is-
sues of labour market flexibility and opportunities for increased em-
ployment.
Another important macroeconomic aspect of health care financ-
ing is the unfavourable mix between public and private financing. In 
both EU-15 and EU-10, expenditure of the public sector accounts for 
about 75% of total health care spending, and private expenditure for 
the remaining 25% (Annex Table A4). In Croatia, private expenditure 
accounts for about 16% of health care spending. However, patients 
pay virtually this entire amount (about 1.3% of GDP) out of their own 
pockets, as private health insurance is for all practical purposes non- 
existent. In EU-15 countries, out-of-pocket payments account for a 
slightly higher percentage of total health expenditure (about 17.5%), 
but private health insurance accounts for a significantly higher portion 
of expenditure (about 7.5%).xxxi In other words, Croatian citizens al-
ready pay for health care almost as much out of their pockets as EU 
citizens. The reform of health care financing should thus primarily cre-
ate conditions for redirecting one part of health insurance from HZZO 
to private insurance companies, while payments of citizens on average 
would not need to increase significantly. 
The HZZO, which accounts for 95% of total health care spend-
ing, has generally operated close to balance or with a small deficit 
(Graph 1). Expenditure growth was particularly strong during 1997-
2000, when it exceeded nominal GDP growth and nominal wage 
growth by a large margin (Graph 1). Strong expenditure growth (ex-
ceeding nominal wage growth) took place again in 2004, when the larg-
est HZZO deficit so far was recorded, exceeding 1 billion kuna (0.5% 
of GDP). One could conclude from these trends that the financial po-
sition of HZZO has so far been basically sustainable: revenues have 
tracked expenditures fairly closely, and when a deficit occurred it was 
reversed quickly. In addition, since 2001 HZZO revenue and spending 
have been growing more slowly than either nominal GDP or nominal 
wages, with the exception of 2004.
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Graph 1  HZZO revenues and expenditures (annual percentage changes,  
left-hand scale) and balance (million kuna, right-hand scale) 
Sources: HZZO (2006); DZS (2006); author’s calculations.
However, there are some important caveats to this conclusion. 
The first is that HZZO finances only a small portion of capital spend-
ing in the health care sector (less than 0.3% of total spending in 2005). 
The bulk of finance for capital spending is provided by the Ministry 
of Health, local governments and through foreign aid. Moreover, de-
preciation of fixed capital and equipment is apparently not counted as 
cost, thus understating total operating costs and raising serious ques-
tions about the capacity of the system for future investment. The 2002 
health care development strategy estimated that the real value of capital 
equipment in many health care institutions was reduced to 20% of book 
value (Office for the Strategy of Development of Croatia, 2002:9). 
The second caveat is that, from 1996 to 2003, HZZO accumu-
lated debt (as measured by outstanding bills) of over 2 billion kuna (1% 
of GDP). Complete data for 2004 and 2005 are not available, but add-
ing deficits in 2004 and 2005 to this figure yields an estimate of debt 
of about 3.7 billion kuna or 1.6% of GDP. Information about the serv-
icing of this debt is very patchy. According to the Ministry of Health 
(2006:21), during 2004 more than 3 billion kuna of outstanding HZZO 
debt (arising from bank loans and unpaid bills to wholesale drug suppli-
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ers) from 2000, 2002 and 2003 was repaid. But despite this settlement, 
by 2005 HZZO had been forced to take a loan of over 800 million from 
Zagrebačka banka to reduce its maturing debt (HZZO, 2006:2). Al-
though this loan represents a significant amount for HZZO (about 15% 
of total revenue), its accounts consistently show debt servicing costs 
of only about 0.3% of total expenditure. One can easily conclude from 
this piecemeal information that much greater transparency is needed in 
the financial reporting of HZZO and Ministry of Health before the fi-
nancial sustainability of the state-run health insurance system can be 
properly assessed.
REFORM PROPOSALS
The Croatian health care sector has been in a state of more or 
less permanent change since the early 1990s. While initial reforms fo-
cused on the transformation of the system inherited from the period of 
self-managed socialism, reforms in recent years have for the most part 
focused on various aspects of health care financing. The main goals of 
the 2000-02 round of reforms were thus to contain spending from the 
public sources; reduce the payroll contribution rate by limiting bene-
fits and increasing the share of private costs; and improve efficiency 
through reorganisation of the delivery system and devolution of greater 
responsibilities in primary and secondary care to the local authorities.
The latest round of reforms, launched in 2006, similarly focuses 
on cost containment. As shown in Graph 2, the fastest rising compo-
nents of health care expenditure between 2002 and 2005 were spending 
on specialised care, which expanded by 67% (i.e. at an average annual 
rate of 19%) and pharmaceuticals, which increased by 57% (i.e. at an 
annual rate of 16%). The costs in primary and hospital care were more 
or less contained, while expenditure on sick leave, maternity leave and 
disability allowances declined 2.5%. 
The key measures aimed at containing the rise in spending on 
pharmaceuticals is the introduction of a more restricted list of medi-
cines (so-called basic list) that can be obtained without co-payment, 
and the inclusion of a larger number of generic drugs on this list. Ac-
cording to official estimates, this measure will result in annual savings 
of some 300 million kuna.xxxii
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Graph 2  Main components of HZZO expenditure (billion kuna, left-hand scale) 
and cumulative growth of expenditure from 2002 to 2005 (%, right-
hand scale)
Sources: HZZO; author’s calculations.
In the primary care sector, possible measures listed by the 2006 
health care development strategy include reducing the number of pa-
tients to be covered by a team of physicians; encouraging group medi-
cal practice so as to reduce administrative costs; introducing the so-
called found-holding system of payments to general practitioners;xxxiii 
and certain measures to encourage preventative care (see HZSS, 2006: 
43-45). In the hospital sector, one proposal is to introduce payments 
based on so-called diagnosis-related groups.xxxiv However, details of 
these proposals have yet to be elaborated.
The macroeconomic aspects of health care financing have not 
been addressed by the latest reform, nor has much thought been given 
to eliminating other microeconomic distortions in health care financ-
ing (with the partial exception of primary care) and addressing vari-
ous market and government failures identified in this paper. Moreover, 
the mere announcement of key measures related to pharmaceuticals has 
met with stiff public opposition. One can therefore doubt that the lat-
est reform will provide more than temporary restraint on the growth of 
overall health care costs. 
A more fundamental shortcoming of the strategy is that it does 
not raise the issue of the healthcare costs of the ageing population. Re-
search for other European countries indicates that demands on health 
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insurance resources in order to finance expenditure related to ageing 
population and long-term care for the elderly will increase massively. 
OECD projections suggest that, in the absence of policy action, public 
spending on health and long-term care in the major industrial countries 
could surge from an average 7% of GDP in 2005 to 13% in 2050.xxxv 
The current “fire-fighting” problems of the authorities pale in compari-
son with the challenges that these long-term developments will pose.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHERE  
WE STAND AND HOW TO PROCEED
There are three main models of health care financing in devel-
oped market economies. Many continental European countries, includ-
ing Croatia, use so-called social insurance model, in which funding for 
health care – but also pensions, unemployment and other social risks 
– comes mainly from compulsory contributions (payroll taxes) paid by 
workers and their employers.xxxvi In the second, national health insur-
ance model, used in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada, among 
others, the principal source of funding is general tax revenue rather than 
specific contributions earmarked for health insurance. As a result, the 
health authorities have to compete for government funding with other 
users of public funds (education, transportation, etc.) much more in-
tensively. The third main model is used only in the United States. It is 
unusual in that most workers and their families are insured privately 
through their employers, so that private funding accounts for a much 
larger share of total health spending. But even the United States has 
two major public health insurance programmes: Medicare (for the eld-
erly) and Medicaid (for the poor), both financed through a mixture of 
general taxes and payroll contributions.
The three models have been slowly converging. The European 
and American models are assimilating elements of national health in-
surance: in France, social security contributions are now supplemented 
by revenues from personal and corporate income taxes; in the United 
States a big expansion of government spending on older people to help 
pay for their medicines will be financed from income tax revenues; and 
in the United Kingdom social security contributions were raised sig-
nificantly in 2002 to collect additional funding for the National Health 
Service.
These trends suggest that it is unrealistic for the Croatian au-
thorities and the public to expect that the current model of health care 
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financing can be retained. As noted above, about 80% of funding in this 
model comes from mandatory contributions that are paid almost entire-
ly by employers and are assessed on a relatively narrow tax base – sal-
aries of employees. Employed persons, in turn, account for only one-
third of the population and their share in total population will shrink as 
the process of ageing accelerates over the coming decades. Continued 
reliance on payroll tax will thus place an increasingly heavy burden on 
the productive labour force and on the economy.xxxvii 
This means that a significantly greater portion of HZZO fund-
ing should come from general tax revenues in the future. At the mo-
ment, it is not clear which part of health expenditure for the two-thirds 
of the population who are not paying payroll contributions is covered 
by transfers from the budget. The fact that the government often resorts 
to deficit financing to settle unpaid bills in the health care sector indi-
cates that these transfers are insufficient.xxxviii Since many citizens who 
do not pay contributions – in particular the elderly – are heavy users of 
health care services, it is appropriate that they contribute to the health 
budget. However, many old people do not have sufficient income to 
make meaningful contribution to health care financing. On the other 
hand, they contribute to general taxes through the value-added tax and 
excises (and, in some cases, personal income taxes), so from an equity 
perspective it makes sense to use more of this revenue to finance health 
care. Moreover, this approach is feasible because the authorities will 
anyway have to reduce spending on items such as economic subsidies 
as part of the EU accession process. 
The first major recommendation for health care reform is thus 
to change the HZZO financing mix in favour of general tax revenues 
transferred from the central and local budgets. As shown in Graph 3, 
Croatia stands apart from the old and new members of the EU in that the 
share of state health insurance funding is disproportionately high (80% 
of total health care funding) and the share of government budget dis-
proportionately low (only 3%). Another clear imbalance is the negligi-
ble share of private health insurance in health care financing.xxxix These 
imbalances have to change in the direction of the EU average. The first 
imbalance could be redressed as part of the annual budget process and 
need not even be called a reform. The main requirement would be to 
determine the proportion of health care costs for the two-thirds of the 
population who do not pay contributions that will be covered from gen-
eral taxes. The basic health insurance contribution rate and the employ-
er/employee split of that rate would not have to be changed at first, al-
though over time the contribution rate would have to be reduced in or-
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der to create conditions for stronger employment growth. In addition, 
much greater transparency would be needed with respect to the out-
standing debt of the health care system and its servicing. A related issue 
that would need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive reform is 
financing of capital expenditure in the health care system.
Graph 3  Structure of health care ﬁnancing in Croatia and European Union,
2003 (as a percentage of total health care expenditure) 
Sources: HZZO (2004); HANFA (2006); WHO (2006); author’s calculations.
The second major recommendation in terms of potential impact 
on HZZO finances would be to re-examine the social benefits and costs 
of the current system of sick leave and maternity leave allowances. 
As discussed in Section 5, Croatia has, internationally, one of the most 
generous systems of sick leave and maternity leave allowances, which 
together account for almost 1% of GDP. The sick-leave allowances 
in particular are open to abuse and there is really no reason why the 
state should bear the entire risk of workers’ absence from jobs due to 
illness. 
The long maternity leave – usually one year in Croatia, com-
pared with 16 weeks on average in most industrial countriesxl – is 
often defended as necessary to help increase the low birth rate. Howev-
er, it is probably not the most effective instrument to achieve this goal. 
As elsewhere in the world, the demographic trends observed in Croatia 
are of a secular nature and the low birth rate cannot be reversed by a 
single policy measure such as long maternity leave. Recent research in-
dicates that in OECD countries the greatest impact on the fertility rate 
comes from the female employment rate and availability of affordable 
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child-care facilities, which allows mothers to return to work relatively 
quickly after giving birth.xli Against this background, it might be per-
haps more beneficial for women and the society as a whole to reduce 
the length of maternity leave to, say, six months – which would still be 
generous by developed country standards – and to invest the funds thus 
saved in an expansion of subsidised child care facilities and simplified 
administrative procedures for part-time work of mothers. This would 
allow mothers to return to work earlier; new jobs would be created in 
this segment of the economy; and the funds the society has invested in 
education of women would perhaps be used more productively than is 
currently the case.
Finally, the issue of insufficient disability and veterans’ allow-
ances could be addressed by introducing so-called “zero pillar” of 
pension insurance. The aim of this pillar would be to prevent poverty 
among the disabled, veterans, the elderly and other persons with insuf-
ficient means to secure a minimum socially acceptable standard of liv-
ing for themselves. 
Regarding microeconomic aspects of health care financing, the 
government’s proposals to help control expenditure on pharmaceuticals 
are necessary and welcome. However, these measures deal more with 
the symptoms than the causes of the rapid growth of expenditure on 
medicines and can therefore be regarded as a temporary stop-gap meas-
ure. As discussed above, the escalation of costs of pharmaceuticals and 
specialised care can be traced to inappropriate incentives provided to 
the primary health care under the system of flat fees per patient. While 
this system is easy to administer and prevents over-billing of HZZO by 
primary care providers, any savings from these features of the system 
are now probably outweighed by the costs of prescription medicines 
and increased referrals of patients to specialised institutions. 
What is needed is a system of payments under which primary-
care providers would have an incentive to act as true “gatekeepers” of 
the health care system. One possibility could be fee-for-service pay-
ments based on the points system, with appropriate monitoring and 
auditing of bills submitted by primary care providers. This system is 
widely used in continental European countries and would probably 
be more effective in checking the rise in expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals and specialised care than the series of piecemeal cost containment 
measures introduced over the years. 
Similarly, the direction in which the authorities are moving with 
regard to hospital and specialised care – implementing more wide-
ly the system of prospective payments based on therapeutic treatment 
306
groups, and introducing a system of payments based on diagnosis- 
related groups – is necessary and welcome. However, the loophole in 
this system that allows hospitals to choose the billing options that are 
most advantageous to them (and, hence, more costly to HZZO) would 
need to be closed. 
Another widely recognised weakness of the Croatian hospital 
system that would need to be addressed over the medium term is lack 
of appropriate management skills.xlii Virtually the entire secondary and 
tertiary health care sectors are managed by physicians, who often lack 
the adequate training in strategic management, financial planning and 
other skills necessary for hospital management in a competitive mar-
ket environment. Moreover, physicians in the role of hospital manag-
ers face an inherent conflict of interest: as hospital managers, they de-
cide how to allocate the funds within the hospital, so they can direct the 
funds to the department where they spend these funds as physicians.xliii 
If these two functions are merged in one decision maker, impartial fi-
nancial control at the hospital level becomes very difficult. 
In addition, the functions of monitoring and auditing financial 
operations of health care institutions are apparently neglected and 
would need to be significantly strengthened. The authorities worldwide 
are working harder at getting better value for the money they provide to 
hospitals and specialised care institutions.xliv Health-care expenditure 
is rising not just because of new technologies and rising demand, but 
also because the health care sector is dominated by powerful providers 
– pharmaceutical and medical technology companies, hospitals and in-
fluential doctors – who find it fairly easy to pass on the costs from new 
medical technologies to the state.xlv 
The overriding goal of recent health care reforms in developed 
market economies is therefore to ensure more effective use of pub-
lic funds. One approach to this goal is to introduce more competition 
into healthcare markets, for instance, by allowing hospitals to keep fi-
nancial surpluses and reinvest them in services. A complementary ap-
proach is to turn to the private sector to provide more healthcare servic-
es. In particular, it is important to recognise that public financing does 
not have to mean public provision of health care. In most European 
countries, the health care sector functions as a mixture of public and 
private providers. In Croatia, aside from dental and partly primary care, 
the role of the private sector as a provider remains limited.xlvi One rea-
son for this state of affairs is that HZZO does not seem to have the ad-
ministrative capacity to process and monitor reimbursement of medi-
cal bills submitted by individuals and private providers for treatment in 
private medical facilities. 
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A more fundamental reason is that the authorities in Croatia 
have still not elaborated a consistent framework for private sector in-
volvement in the health care sector. What measures were taken in the 
past were taken randomly – for instance, the leasing of publicly-owned 
facilities for use as doctors’ private offices or the recent proposal to lease 
unused hospital capacity to private health insurance companies.xlvii Such 
partial measures have not made the system more efficient nor have they 
provided much benefit to health care users (although individual physi-
cians have realised significant benefits for themselves). 
The same conclusion applies to the development of private 
health insurance: a consistent institutional, regulatory and market 
framework in which private health insurance companies are expected 
to function and incentives for their development have yet to be elabo-
rated. As shown in Graph 3, private health insurance covers only 0.6% 
of total health care costs in Croatia, compared with 7% on average in 
EU-15 and 4% in EU-10. It is unrealistic, for instance, to expect that 
private health insurers will find much interest in the newly created mar-
ket for pharmaceuticals if the supplementary health insurance scheme 
operated by the HZZO will cover some of the costs of medicines not 
included in the basic list.xlviii In addition, there are indications that pri-
vate health insurance companies in Croatia are regulated perhaps too 
loosely, so that it is not clear they operate in the best interest of insured 
persons.xlix
This brings us to the next major area that has seen little progress 
over the years: reform of the co-payments system. Co-payments con-
tribute little to the overall health budget; they are difficult to administer 
because of many exemptions; and are disliked by the public. Yet having 
people participate in bearing the costs of health care is the first step to-
ward a true health care reform. Health is not a free resource and cannot 
be maintained without costs being incurred. The society does not benefit 
from unused medicines and unnecessary visits to the doctor. If people 
understand that each time they visit a doctor someone – including them-
selves – has to pay to cover the costs, such waste can be reduced.l Co-
payments should thus be understood as user fees – the cost of accessing 
the system of health care, similar to road tolls as the cost of accessing 
the system of highways. The current state of affairs is in that respect 
untenable: as shown in Figure 3, only 16% of health care spending in 
Croatia is covered from private sources, compared with the average of 
26% for EU members. Within the private sources of funding, there is in 
particular an imbalance between out-of-pocket expenditure, which is 
close to the EU average, and costs covered by private health insurance 
companies, which are way below the EU average.
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The experience of Slovakia shows that people are willing to ac-
cept the notion that good health is primarily their own responsibility 
and that every individual has to participate in health care financing.li 
Moreover, the Slovak experience shows that the introduction of a well 
designed co-payment system does not hurt access to health care.lii For 
their part, the authorities should contribute to this understanding by 
making much more serious, frequent and visible efforts targeted at the 
prevention of major health risks related to unhealthy lifestyles.
In summary, problems facing the healthcare sector in Croatia are 
not new or unique. Solid economic analysis and judicious use of other 
countries’ experiences lead to many well-tried solutions and allow us to 
avoid many mistakes. A key factor for the success of healthcare reform 
is the authorities’ ability to manage political economy aspects of the re-
form. The effects of health care reform are felt immediately by the en-
tire population. By contrast, the effects of pension reform are delayed 
and are felt by only one segment of the population at a time. The au-
thorities therefore need to manage expectations of different stakehold-
ers in health care reform much more carefully and actively. For a re-
form to succeed, the public needs in particular to see the forest for the 
trees: the authorities need to elaborate a clear vision of healthcare re-
form in whose centre stands good health for all Croatian citizens. The 
authorities would also be well advised to avoid the illusion that expe-
rience and possible success in implementation of pension reform also 
guarantee the success of health care reform.
Finally, one should emphasise that technical complexity of 
healthcare policy and reform should not be underestimated. Economists 
and healthcare experts in Croatia should therefore make a much more 
substantive contribution to health care reform than has been the case 
so far. This paper has indicated that more detailed research is needed in 
several areas. These include macroeconomic aspects of health care (fi-
nancial sustainability of the health care sector in the medium and long 
term; public and private sources of funds; the mix of taxes and con-
tributions among public sources of funds; impact of different financ-
ing models on the labour market; fiscal effects of decentralisation of 
health care); microeconomic aspects of health care (impact of differ-
ent financing arrangements on incentives, operations and efficiency of 
health care institutions; management of health care institutions; organi-
sation and regulation of markets for health care services, pharmaceuti-
cals and health insurance); and the political economy of health care re-
form.
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i  There is some empirical evidence on this effect. In the late 1970s, the RAND 
Corporation did an extensive study randomly assigning families to health plans 
with co-payment levels at 0%, 25%, 50%, or 95%, up to a maximum amount of 
6,000 US dollars. As expected, the less that people were asked to pay for their 
health care, the more often they visited the doctor (see Phelps, 1993).
ii  Here one should distinguish between routine visits to the doctor (for minor 
illnesses such as colds, light injuries, etc.) and preventative health care (e.g. 
annual medical, dental and vision check-ups). In addition to clear medical 
rationale, preventative care is also in the economic interest of health insurance 
companies, whether publicly or privately-owned. This is reﬂected in the fact that
insurance often covers the cost of check-ups up to a certain limit. Many health care 
commentators fail to notice the difference between routine visits and preventative 
care; see e.g. Gladwell (2005) in an otherwise highly stimulating article on moral 
hazard in US health insurance.
iii  This statement can also be applied to many western European countries at the 
moment. 
iv  For a comprehensive review, see McGuire and Mayhew (1989).
v  This information monopoly can be reduced through better education and greater 
availability of medical information through media, in particular the internet.
vi  There is no empirical research to support this claim, but there is widespread 
anecdotal evidence that patients in Croatia often experience situations in which 
doctors prescribe treatment without discussing in detail the pros and cons of the 
treatment with the patient and his or her family (see: www.pravapacijenata.hr and 
Vjesnik, 21 August 2006). Another indication of inadequate information provided 
to patients in Croatia is the practice of writing diagnoses in Latin, which sets 
doctors in Croatia apart from their colleagues in other European countries (see 
Vjesnik, 12 and 13 August 2006).
vii  Based on HZZO data published in Vjesnik, 10 October 2005.
viii  Instead, one often gets the impression that the authorities have adopted a cavalier 
attitude vis-à-vis some health risks, in particular smoking; see, e.g. complaints 
about smoking in ofﬁces and public rooms in the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and the Ministry of Culture (“Smoking is forbidden and they smoke 
‘like Turks’”, Vjesnik, 16 August 2006, Readers’ mail). Another case in point is the 
public reprimand of an assistant minister of health who announced in May 2006 
that the government was preparing a stricter law on smoking in public places 
that would be aligned with EU legislation. That statement was denied by the 
government the same day with an explanation that the existing law already deﬁned
clearly where one could and where one could not smoke (Vjesnik, 1 June 2006).
ix  The bribery case against the head of heart surgery in clinical hospital in Rijeka 
(see Večernji list, 17 August 2006) has highlighted a situation long denied by the 
healthcare profession. For instance, the Croatian Physicians’ Association has 
processed only four cases of bribery since 1995 (Vjesnik, 19 August 2006).
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x  A typical case is that of a patient who comes for a check-up in a state health facility 
in the morning and is told by the doctor that she needs certain diagnostic tests. 
The tests are free but the waiting list is so long that, for non-urgent cases it could 
take months to get an appointment. However, if the patient is willing to pay out of 
her pocket, she could take the tests that same afternoon in the same facility from 
the same doctor, as it becomes doctor’s own private ofﬁce after regular working
hours.
xi  Physicians were subject to income tax for this type of work but did not have to pay 
the value-added tax. This practice was ended in mid-2006. However, physicians 
will still be allowed to work outside their full-time job (at most one-third of working 
hours) and in service of private insurance companies, which will be allowed to 
rent excess hospital beds and rooms (Poslovni dnevnik, 24 March 2006). To their 
credit, the authorities at least admitted that private work of physicians in health 
institutions in which they held full-time jobs was unethical (ibid.).
xii  Indeed, without referring to government failure, the 2002 health care development 
strategy concludes that “Croatia needs a health care system that will be serve 
the health of the population, not its own survival” (Ofﬁce for the Strategy of
Development of Croatia, 2002:12).
xiii  The main references for this section are McKee, MacLehose and Nolte (2004); 
McKee [et al.] (2004); and Božičević and Orešković (2004).
xiv  See Poslovni dnevnik, 21 July 2006 (www.poslovni.hr).
xv  Useful and concise sources of information on the health care sector in Croatia are 
WHO (2005), Stevenson and Stubbs (2003) and Mastilica and Kušec (2006).
xvi  The standardised mortality rate for all alcohol related diseases (including liver 
cirrhosis, ishaemic heart disease, mouth and oropharynx cancer, trafﬁc casualties,
falls and intentional injuries) in Croatia is 195 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, 
compared with 155 deaths in Austria; 97 in France, Greece and Italy; and 89 in 
Portugal (WHO, 2004a:57). 
xvii  This deﬁnition includes physically inactive and minimally active population. For
details see Country proﬁles on WHO’s Global InfoBase Online (http://www.who.
int/ncd_surveillance/infobase/web/ InfoBaseCommon/).
xviii  See for instance MZSS (2006:16, 17, 30), where smoking and alcohol consumption, 
mentioned more or less incidentally, are the only health risks discussed, partly 
in the context of increased immigration into Croatia in the second half of the 
1990s. Obesity and physical inactivity are nowhere mentioned in this strategic 
document.
xix  See MZSS (2006:17).
xx  For details, see World Bank (2004) and two recent strategies for the health care 
sector: Ofﬁce for the Strategy of Development of Croatia (2002) and MZSS
(2006).
xxi  Trend decline in the provision of preventative services was noted already several 
years ago: in 2000 there were 79% fewer check-ups of adults, 41% fewer check-
ups at patients’ homes and 89% fewer home visits than in 1990 (Ofﬁce for the
Strategy of Development of Croatia, 2002:11).
xxii  Each primary care doctor is expected to carry at least about 1,700 patients per year 
on a roster. This is relatively low compared with EU average (2,000-2,500 patients 
per primary care doctor) and indicates that a considerable potential for “piling-
up” of patients does exist. The lower ﬁgure was apparently chosen deliberately in
order to encourage physicians to work in under-served areas, where they could 
earn more under the system of capitation payments. 
315
xxiii  There are some solid indications that patients in Croatia have a tendency towards 
excessive use of medicines; see Vjesnik, 10 October 2005. A particular problem is 
excessive use of antibiotics, which can lead to the development of resistant forms 
of bacteria and thus put in danger not only the health of the patients but also that 
of all other people.
xxiv  See Article 17 of the Health Insurance Law (www.hzzo-net.hr).
xxv  These include children and students, retirees, the unemployed, people receiving 
minimum income, recruits in mandatory military service and war veterans.
xxvi  See DZS (2006).
xxvii  For instance, the 2001 Household Budget Survey shows that for about 7% of retiree 
households, health costs represented more than 10% of total spending (World 
Bank, 2004:41). A survey by Mastilica and Božikov (1999) found that total out-of-
pocket health care expenditure represented over 17% of income for individuals in 
the lowest 25% income group, compared with less than 3% for the top 25% income 
group.
xxviii  See for instance Večernji list, 17 July 2006 and 2 August 2006.
xxix  This includes employees in private and public sectors, the self-employed and 
farmers.
xxx  Who exactly bears the burden of health contributions (and what part of it) – 
whether the employer at the expense of proﬁts or workers at the expense of wages
– cannot be determined because there has been no research on the incidence of 
payroll taxes, nor on elasticity of labour demand and supply in Croatia (I am 
indebted for this insight to Sandra Švaljek). However, one can assume that health 
care contributions increase the cost of labour regardless of who pays them.
xxxi  The share of private expenditure on health care in EU is 25%. Out of this, 70% 
is ﬁnanced by the households and 30% by private insurance companies. Out-of-
pocket payments are thus 17.5% on average (=0.25x0.70), which is somewhat 
higher than in Croatia (16.4% in 2003).
xxxii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 12 April 2006.
xxxiii  Under the system of found-holding, ﬁnancial resources for health care are allocated
on a per capita basis and are held in a fund, with the general practitioner usually 
deciding on the allocation of resources in the fund. The ﬁnancial incentives offered
by this scheme are in the form of control over budgets to be spent on patient care 
and not in the form of personal ﬁnancial incentives. A disadvantage of this system
(noted in the United Kingdom) is that it might introduce some inequities in the 
provision of health care.
xxxiv  Under payment system based on diagnostic groups, patients are categorised on the 
basis of diagnoses and resources needed for their hospital treatment. This system 
can help reduce costs to the health insurance compared with the fee-for-service 
scheme, but introduces other incentives that might give rise to high costs, such 
as categorising patients into more complex and therefore expensive diagnostic 
groups (so-called “code creep”).
xxxv  See OECD (2006) and European Commission (2006). 
xxxvi  This model is often referred to as Bismarckian, named after the greatest German 
statesman of the 19th century Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898). One should note 
that at the time Bismarck introduced Europe’s ﬁrst social security system (which
comprised health, old-age retirement and disability insurance) his main concerns 
were to appease the working class (and thereby reduce socialism’s appeal to 
the public) and prevent poverty among the old. The social security system was 
ﬁnancially viable because average life expectancy at the time was around 55 years 
(see Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002).
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xxxvii  The authorities have made some progress in this regard by gradually reducing the 
contribution rate from 18% in 1998 to 15% in 2004. Despite the reduction in rates, 
more revenue was collected from contributions, suggesting that a combination of 
improved collection and reduced exemptions had a positive effect.
xxxviii  For instance, in 2002 the central budget transfer to HZZO dropped to 9% of HZZO 
revenues, down from 16% in 2001. At the same time, the government borrowed 820 
million kuna (6% of HZZO revenues) to pay back the old arrears vis-à-vis health 
care suppliers (World Bank, 2004:40). 
xxxix  The share of private health insurance companies is calculated from gross health 
insurance premia paid (amounting to 105 million kuna in 2003, based on HANFA 
(2006)), and total health expenditure based on WHO (2006).
xl  See Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and 
Family Policies at Columbia University (www.childpolicyintl.org/issuebrief/
issuebrief5table1.pdf).
xli  See D’Addio and D’Ercole (2005). Among countries with the highest fertility rates 
in OECD are the Scandinavian countries, France and the United States, which 
at the same time have some of the highest female employment rates. On the other 
hand, even though in Italy and Spain only every third woman works, the birth rate 
is just 1.3 children per woman.
xlii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 1 June 2006 and 31 July 2006.
xliii  This insight comes from Vlado Puljiz; see Poslovni dnevnik, 1 June 2006.
xliv  See the leading article in The Economist, 18 August 2005.
xlv  One enduring myth in health care economics is that costs of health care are rising 
because of the rapid advance and increasing availability of expensive medical 
technologies. However, despite the widespread use of new medical technology, 
health care costs have followed very different paths in different countries, indicating 
that much of the increase in costs has been supply-induced (Hsiao, 2000). Jones 
(2005) highlights the importance of increasing demand for health care services as 
a determinant of rising health care costs.
xlvi  In 2003, only 3 special hospitals and 4 health resorts out of 73 hospitals and 
health resorts were privately owned. Out of a total of 6,660 registered medical 
practices, about 2,800 were privately-owned, of which as many as 2,400 were 
dentists’ ofﬁces. More than half of some 1,100 pharmacies were privately owned
(WHO, 2005a).
xlvii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 24 March 2006.
xlviii  See Lider, 17 March 2006; Poslovni dnevnik, 19 May 2006; and Vjesnik, 17 August 
2006. On the development of private health insurance companies see a very useful 
study by OECD (2004).
xlix  See World Bank (2004:19-21).
l  Statements by some politicians that Croatian citizens are not ready to accept the 
shift of a part of health care to the market clearly do not help the cause of health 
care reform (see e.g. Poslovni tjednik, 16 June 2006). If Croatian citizens are not 
ready to accept more market-based health care, how can the Croatian state be in 
a position to accept it? It is interesting to note in this context that Croatians spend 
on average more on mobile phone bills (about 360 euros per year) than on health 
care (about 350 euros per year). One should not question consumer rationality, 
however, faced with undistorted price of health care, consumers would be certainly 
be able to choose between spending on health and mobile phones. 
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li  See Pažitny, Zajac and Marcinčin (2005). For a comprehensive overview of 
experiences with health care reform in OECD countries see Docteur and Oxley 
(2004).
lii  The basic principles for an efﬁcient and equitable system of co-payments are
well-established in the health economics literature and include: high co-payments 
for small, frequent, cheap and everyday diseases; low or no co-payments for 
rare, severe and costly diseases, for patients suffering from chronic diseases 
or disabilities, and for preventative health care (annual check-ups); lower co-
payments for the poor and the elderly; and an upper limit on health care costs as 
a percentage of annual income (see Osterkamp, 2003a; 2003b).
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